



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ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN
48108

6 July 1973



WFC/bc



Mr. William E. Colby
Director-Designate
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

I read with a good deal of interest the story about you and your new responsibilities that appeared recently in the NEW YORK TIMES.

This prompted some recollections of my reactions to intelligence during my 1969-1970 tour as Principal Deputy at the Pentagon's Office of International Security Affairs.

First, I was impressed with the enormous amount of information or intelligence that was available to us every day at the decision-making level, but I also was depressed with the seeming lack of availability of this intelligence in a useable form at the time decisions actually had to be made. Unless I knew where to go or whom to ask, I did not have the best intelligence at the moment I had to sign off on a paper. Usually, there was not time to dig further.

Second, although ISA is one of the largest consumers of intelligence in the defense community, it had almost nothing to say concerning the development of intelligence requirements. It did not (and still may not) participate in any of the inter-agency groups that develop intelligence plans and it is not consulted on such. At the same time, I must admit that the ISA staff had surprisingly few comments or complaints on the adequacy or quality of the intelligence received.

Third, I recall one illustration of inadequate intelligence and evaluation from a meeting that was held in the office of the ASD. The representative from your shop presented an analysis of the economic burden of military spending in the Soviet that in general implied some of the

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same conclusions and theories that were current in 1950-1955. There seemed to be a basic assumption that the Soviet Union could keep up economically with the United States, no matter how great a burden might be imposed by military requirements. On this same occasion the briefing team also informed us that the Soviet had no intention other than to maintain parity with U.S. strategic power. Questioning revealed that at the same time U.S. intelligence had no precise knowledge of Soviet weapon technology so a reconciliation of the two views appeared difficult.

Lastly, my notes from those days of four years ago show four generalizations about U.S. intelligence. (1) It always appeared to be based on the "mirror image" concept. I think it is dangerous for the U.S. to assume that the Soviet will react to the U.S. as the U.S. would react to that country. (2) Allowance never seemed to be made for the unpredictable or the acts of irrational leaders. (3) Analysis and evaluation of events in one way or another seemed to support the policy already decided or assumed to have been decided at the highest level. I found this to be especially true on some aspects of our relations with Japan and on strategic trade matters in Central Europe. (4) I never learned of any post-mortems being held to evaluate the performance of intelligence, especially the analysis aspect.

These observations probably are of no great import, but at least they come from an individual who has no vested interest in any aspect of the whole intelligence operation.

You are to be congratulated upon your appointment. You have before you an enormous opportunity with grave responsibilities. I wish you well.

Warm regards.

Faithfully,

